Roald Amundsen and Capt Robert Falcon Scott’s expedition to the South Pole

Roald Amundsen

1872-1928

Roald Amundsen, born in 1872 near Oslo, Norway, left

his mark on the Heroic Era as one of the most

successful polar explorers ever born. His career of

adventure began at the age of 15, originally studying

medicine, but dropping out to go to sea where he soon

moved his way up to the rank of mate. His first

experience in the Antarctic was with Adrien de

Gerlache's 1899 BELGICA EXPEDITION. He became

the first to travel the Northwest Passage, in his ship

Gjoa in 1903-06. After this expedition, plans were

assembled to drift across the North Pole in Nansen's

famous FRAM, but news arrived of Peary's successful

attainment of the pole which caused Amundsen to

make new plans--covert plans--for an expedition to the

Antarctic and the subsequent capture of the South

Pole. On December 14, 1911, Amundsen and four

others stood at the South Pole, a month before Robert

Scott. This expedition was an incredible masterpiece of

organization.

The story…

"The North Pole is reached!" was the news that flashed all over the world...it was September 1909

when the news reached Amundsen. The original plan of the FRAM'S third voyage--the exploration

of the North Polar basin--was quickly called off. In order to save the expedition, Amundsen

immediately turned his attention to the South simultaneously emphasizing to his financial

contributors that the FRAM'S Arctic voyage would be, in every way, a scientific expedition and

would have nothing to do with record-breaking. Therefore, as far as the supporters were aware,

Amundsen's Arctic voyage would not be influenced one way or another by Peary's

accomplishment. Since he was so heavily in debt, Amundsen felt his change in plans to head south

and capture the South Pole should be kept a secret. In his own words, Amundsen wrote, "I know

that I have been reproached for not having at once made the extended plan public, so that not only

my supporters, but the explorers who were preparing to visit the same regions might have

knowledge of it. I was well aware that these reproaches would come, and had therefore carefully

weighed this side of the matter". As hinted at, he also felt it important to keep his intentions secret

from his peers. "Nor did I feel any great scruples with regard to the other Antarctic expeditions that

were being planned at the time. I knew I should be able to inform Captain Scott of the extension of

my plans before he left civilization, and therefore a few months sooner or later could be of no great

importance. Scott's plan and equipment were so widely different from my own that I regarded the

telegram that I sent him later, with the information that we were bound for the Antarctic regions,

rather as a mark of courtesy than as a communication which might cause him to alter his programme

in the slightest degree. The British expedition was designed entirely for scientific research. The Pole

was only a side-issue, whereas in my extended plan it was the main object". Amundsen must have

been in a dream world as this simply was not true. Scott's intention to try for the Pole had been

widely publicized and was certainly not a side issue...one only need turn to Scott's Antarctic

Expedition announcement in the September 13, 1909, issue of The Times of London.

Amundsen admitted that he was heavily in debt and knew that his best chance of raising money was

to bring off a spectacular triumph. Amundsen wrote, "If at that juncture I had made my intention

public, it would only have given occasion for a lot of newspaper discussion, and possibly have ended

in the project being stifled at its birth. Everything had to be got ready quietly and calmly. My

brother, upon whose absolute silence I could blindly rely, was the only person I let into the secret of

my change of plan, and he did me many important services during the time when we alone shared

the knowledge". The only other man to know of the change in plans was the ship's commander,

Lieutenant Thorvald Nilsen. Amundsen kept his plans so secret that only these two men, along with

Lieutenants Prestrud and Gjertsen (told on the eve of the FRAM'S departure), knew of them before

the FRAM reached Madeira, ostensibly on the way to Buenos Aires and then northwards to the

Arctic; the Madeira trip was supposed to be mainly for the purpose of oceanographical research.

The Norwegians left Christiania on August 9, 1910, eight weeks

after Scott's TERRA NOVA EXPEDITION had departed

Cardiff. On board were 97 Greenland dogs, the key to

Amundsen's success, along with a hut and provisions for two

years in the Antarctic. A month later, on September 6, the

FRAM arrived at Madeira where fresh water and other

provisions were taken on board. A few minor repairs were

made to the ship as the crew enjoyed some free time ashore. On

the evening of the 9th, some three hours before departing for

Antarctica, Amundsen called the crew to his attention. Many of

the men were quite puzzled and unhappy to be interrupted as

they were quickly writing final letters for home. As they came

on deck, Amundsen was standing next to a map of Antarctica

pinned to the mainmast. Amundsen spoke, "...it is my intention

to sail Southwards, land a party on the Southern continent and

try to reach the South Pole". Gjertsen wrote, "Most stood there

with mouths agape staring at the Chief like so many question

marks". Amundsen personally asked each man if he would like

to join him on this historic journey. The last man to go ashore

was Amundsen's brother, Leon. His charge would be to mail

the men's letters and cable Scott...but not until the beginning of

October when Amundsen knew he would be beyond the point

of recall. Once Amundsen left Madeira, he vanished, bound for

an unknown destination...Scott never dreamt it would be the

Ross Sea. Scott, on board the TERRA NOVA, arrived in

Melbourne on the evening of October 12, 1910. Among the

mail waiting for him was Amundsen's telegram, sent from

Madeira, which came as a complete surprise: "Beg leave inform

you proceeding Antarctic. Amundsen." Although there is no

record of Scott's reaction, Evans later recalled, "we considered

that he [Amundsen] would go to the Pole from the Weddell Sea

side". In London, Sir Clements Markham eagerly put forth his

opinion: "She [the FRAM] has no more sailing qualities than a

haystack. In any case, Scott will be on the ground and settled

long before Amundsen turns up, if he ever does". Markham

gleaned information from his sources in Norway and reported

to the Royal Geographic Society's secretary, on October 15, that

Amundsen had "quietly got a wintering hut made on board and

100 dogs and a supply of tents and sledges. His secret design

must have been nearly a year old. They believe his mention of

Punta Aranas and Buenos Aires is merely a blind, and that he is

going to McMurdo Sound to try to cut out Scott...If I were

Scott I would not let them land, but he is always too good-

natured". Whatever the rights and wrongs of the matter, the

general view among those involved in Scott's expedition was

that Amundsen's behavior was underhanded.

It took the FRAM four months to reach the Ross Ice Shelf, on January 14, 1911. Amundsen chose

the Bay of Whales as winter headquarters for a number of reasons. First, they could sail a whole

degree farther south than Scott could hope to get in McMurdo Sound, putting them 60 miles closer

to the Pole; secondly, they could set up their headquarters right on top of their field of work; thirdly,

animal life in the Bay of Whales was extraordinarily rich and offered all the fresh meat the men

required in the form of seals, penguins, etc. Besides, it offered a favorable site for an investigation of

the meteorological conditions in all directions and was very easy to reach by ship. Unloading started

on January 15 with camp established two miles inland. The first sledge was loaded with supplies,

hitched to eight dogs and led away by Amundsen.

For the next three weeks, five sledges, 46 dogs and five men transferred some 10 tons of supplies

daily to base camp. Meanwhile, the carpenter, Jorgen Stubberud, supervised the assembly of the

prefabricated hut. After a visit from Scott's TERRA NOVA, the base camp was christened

Framheim--"The home of Fram"--and the depot-laying journeys began. Within a three-week period,

depots were established at 80°S, 81°S and 82°S...more than a ton and a half of supplies had been

stored within 480 miles of the Pole. On April 21 the sun finally sank and the long winter night

began.

A great deal of work had to be done over the next four months.

FRAM, taken by a

Amundsen was well aware of potential problems brought by nine

crewmember aboard

men cramped into close quarters over the long winter nights so a

TERRA NOVA

strict routine was quickly introduced. Six days a week the men

would rise at 7:30 am, have breakfast, start work at 9:00 and have

lunch at noon. They would return to their work at 2:00 pm and

end at 5:15, with the balance of the day to be used as they pleased.

Each man took his turn as the week's housekeeper emptying

ashtrays, sweeping up and generally keeping the hut clean. Each

man had two hooks on which to hang clothes, while the rest of

their small stuff was kept out of sight in a clothes sack nearby. In

addition to the hut in which they lived, fifteen 16-man tents were

erected to store fuel and supplies. Bjaaland and Hassel built a

Scandanavian staple...a sauna. A bottomless box, on a platform

raised two feet off the ice floor, was built large enough to slip over

the man, allowing only his head to protrude. A tin box, fitted

between the platform and the ice floor, was heated by two paraffin

stoves. As the water boiled, the compartment would fill with

steam. When the man was finished, a rope-and-pulley system

would lift the box clear, exposing a naked man, who then had to

make a dash back to the hut. Exposure to the elements would

quickly seal the pores...the event became a Saturday night ritual.

Over the winter, every man had specific chores. Kristian Prestrud, assisted by Hjalmar Johansen,

made scientific observations; Sverre Hassel, assisted by Helmer Hanssen, was nicknamed the

"Managing Director of Framheim's Coal, Oil and Coke Company Limited", the position responsible

for supplying lamps and heaters with fuel. Johansen packed the sledges with pemmican, chocolate,

milk powder and biscuits. Remodelling and overhauling of the expedition's sledging equipment was

left to the skilled carpenter, Olav Bjaaland, assisted by Jorgen Stubberud. Bjaaland was an expert at

reducing unnecessary weight on the sledges. As well as preparing two sets of skis for each man,

Bjaaland lightened the weight of the sledges by nearly one third. Stubberud achieved similar results

with the sledging cases. When Bjaaland was finished, Hanssen and Oscar Wisting would assemble

the sledge using rawhide lashings. In a tiny snow cave off the main storage room, Wisting spent

most of the winter at a sewing machine where new tents were made, complete with floors, from

weight-saving windcloth. The new tents weighed nearly nine pounds less than the tents brought on

the expedition. The camp's cook was an overweight and jolly man named Adolf Lindstrom.

Lindstrom would rise each morning at 6:00 am to prepare a breakfast of hot buckwheat cakes spread

with whortleberry preserve, plus wholemeal bread enriched with wheatgerm, butter and cheese.

Amundsen said Lindstroms' cakes "slipped down with fabulous rapidity". As for lunch, various

meals were prepared from fresh or frozen seal meat, supplemented with tinned meats by the end of

winter. For dessert, tinned California fruits, tarts, pudding, pies and pastries, all made by Lindstrom,

were served. Supper was seal steak, bread with butter, whortleberry jam and cheese. Coffee was the

staple beverage although brandy was served on Saturday evenings, birthdays and holidays.

Amundsen made certain the food at Framheim was very nutritious since he'd learned first-hand the

effects of scurvy while on the BELGICA EXPEDITION in 1897.

The men actually enjoyed getting together each evening

over supper. Since they had worked in different parts of

the camp during the day, rarely was there a lack of

conversation come evening time. Card games, dart

matches, reading and needlework took place often

around the main table. Occasionally the gramophone

was brought out and a few records played. But, despite

the relative easy passing of winter nights, Amundsen

remained worried about Johansen's quick temper.

Forced abstinence from alcohol made Johansen quite

difficult to deal with at times. To make matters worse,

Johansen had as much experience in polar exploration as

Amundsen; he had been to the Arctic with Nansen.

Johansen felt this put him, at worst, on level par with

Amundsen. And then there was the matter of Robert

Scott...how far had the English advanced? Amundsen

was aware that Scott was using motorized sledges

although he doubted their efficiency. Little did he know

of what was going on at McMurdo Sound.

By August 24 the sun had reappeared and the packed sledges were ready to be taken out

from their underground storage. But two long, frustrating months would pass before the

weather was warm enough for them to start the journey to the Pole. Tensions increased as

each day passed. Amundsen would have the men and dogs prepared for departure only to

cancel at the last moment due to inclement weather. The weather had to be clear for their

first run to the 80°S depot, or there was a real risk of missing it. Finally, on Friday,

September 8, 1911, they sped off across the snow...eight men with sledges pulled by 86

dogs; only Lindstrom was left behind as custodian of Framheim. Amundsen wrote that "the

going was splendid" and they covered 31 miles over the next three days. However, on the

morning of the 11th they awoke to frigid temperatures nearing -70°F. By the next day,

conditions were even worse as the fluid in their compasses froze solid. Amundsen

determined that it was simply too risky to continue on towards the Pole. That evening a

decision was made to make a run for the depot, weather permitting, unload their sledges

and race back to Framheim. The weather co-operated and they arrived at the depot on

Thursday. The next evening Hanssen and Stubberud discovered their heels were frostbitten.

As well, a number of the dogs were suffering from the cold; two of the dogs froze to death

in their sleep. At 7:00 the next morning they set off for Framheim.

They would normally keep in sight of each other but the first two sledges moved so rapidly

that the others were soon left behind. The sledge teams continued to break up, with

Bjaaland and Stubberud reaching Framheim first at 6 pm, followed two hours later by

Amundsen's group. A half an hour after that Hassel arrived and six hours later, at 12:30

am, Johansen and Prestrud finally stumbled into camp. Johansen and Prestrud were totally

exhausted, having found Framheim in the dark and fog only by following the barking of

the dogs. At breakfast the next morning, Amundsen finally succeeded in knocking the chip

off Johansen's shoulder when Amundsen asked why it had taken them so long to make it

back to Framheim. Johansen exploded, angrily accusing Amundsen of panicking and

displaying poor leadership qualities when the group had been allowed to split up. In the

dead silence that followed, Amundsen remained speechless. It was what Amundsen had

always feared--a confrontation with the one man in the expedition with experience to equal

his own. This brought to an end the harmony amongst all the men as Amundsen never

forgave Johansen or spoke to him unless absolutely necessary. Amundsen's excuse to the

others was that Hanssen was suffering too severely from frostbite to linger behind...the

men were not totally convinced.

At noon, Amundsen announced to his men a change in plans. Amundsen would lead

one party to the Pole while Prestrud--with Johansen--would lead a second party to explore

King Edward VII Land. Amundsen's decision was not a revengeful one as he felt that if the

Pole party were not successful, at least there might still be a "first" gained for Norway.

Amundsen then spoke to each man individually (ignoring Johansen), asking for his pledge of

loyalty...all gave it. And so, on October 20, 1911, Amundsen, Bjaaland, Wisting, Hassel and

Hanssen departed on their historic journey to the Pole. Four sledges were used, each pulled

with 13 dogs. They made good progress, other than a little trouble with crevasses, and

arrived at 80°S depot on the 24th. They uncovered the provisions and gave the dogs a feast

of seal meat and blubber. The next day the party left with all five men on skis. On the way

south, they spotted a cairn still standing as they had built it the prior April. Thus proving

reliability, another 150 similar cairns were built on the journey south, each left with a written

record inside stating the distance and bearing to the next cairn. Each day, as they built their

cairn, lunch was eaten..."nothing very luxurious", wrote Amundsen, "three or four dry

oatmeal biscuits, that was all. If one wanted a drink, one could mix snow with the biscuit".

They arrived at 82°S depot on November 4. Two days later they left...they were

accomplishing 20 miles each day, in only five hours, after which they would build their cairn,

in an hour and a half, and then rest for the remainder of the day. On November 11 the

peaks of mountains were seen in the distance, which Amundsen later named Queen Maud's

Range, after the Queen of Norway. At the foot of the range they camped and discussed

strategy for the final push to the Pole, some 340 miles distant. The final plan was to take

supplies and provisions for 30 days, along with the remaining 42 dogs, and make the climb.

After reaching the top, 24 of the dogs would be shot, since they would no longer be needed,

using the remaining 18 in the final dash for the Pole. Once reached, six more would be

slaughtered to provide food for the remaining twelve on the trip back to Framheim. On

November 17 they started the climb up the Axel Heiberg Glacier. The weather was warm

and the climb even better as they covered 11.5 miles before making camp at 2000 feet. Four

days later, on November 21, they found themselves at the summit. They'd managed to carry

a ton of supplies to an altitude of 10,000 feet. Twenty-four dogs were shot and the party

stayed at "The Butcher's Shop", as it was now called, for four more days before heading off

into a raging blizzard. They had already waited two days longer than planned so they had no

choice but to push on. For the next ten days they struggled, five men and 18 dogs, against

driving snow in 35 mph winds and thick fog. At last they reached the plateau, only to be

confronted by "The Devil's Ballroom", a glacier with a thin crust of snow covering a number

of dangerous, deep crevasses. This proved to be the last major obstacle.

On December 8, with the sun shining brightly, they passed

Shackleton's farthest south, 88°23'S. They were only 95 miles

from the South Pole. The dogs were hungry and exhausted, the

men had many sores and frostbitten faces, yet still the party

pushed on. The closer they came to the Pole, the more

Amundsen worried that Scott had already beaten them. The

temptation to race on, at full speed, was shared by everyone. At

3:00 pm, on Friday, December 14, 1911, there was a

simultaneous cry of "Halt!" as the sledge meters registered their

arrival at the South Pole. They had achieved their goal. Symbolic

of their struggle in unity, each of the men, with their weathered

and frostbitten hands, grasped the Norwegian flag and planted it

firmly at the geographical South Pole. Amundsen named the

plain King Haakon VII's Plateau. There were festivities in the

tent that evening with each man sharing a little seal meat. At

midnight observations were taken that put them at 89° 56'S.

Arrangements were now made to encircle the camp with a radius

of approximately twelve and a half miles.

At noon, on December 17, the observations had been completed and it was certain the men had

done all that could be done. In order to come a few inches closer to the actual Pole, Hanssen and

Bjaaland went out four geographical miles and promptly returned. Bjaaland surprised Amundsen

when he pulled out a cigar-case full of cigars at dinner. A cigar at the Pole! Following the festival

dinner, preparations for departure began. A tent was erected, naming it Poleheim, with Amundsen

leaving a message inside for Scott, along with a letter for King Haakon. Thirty-nine days later the

party returned to Framheim, as planned, with all five men and 11 dogs "hale and hearty". The

month-long voyage back to Tasmania was a frustrating time for Amundsen, who was now quite

anxious to be the first to announce the news of their achievement. On March 7, 1912, Amundsen

finally cabled his brother Leon with the historic news.

Robert Falcon Scott

(1868-1912)

Robert Falcon Scott CVO (6 June 1868 - c. 29 March 1912) was a Royal Navy officer and explorer

who led two expeditions to the Antarctic regions: the Discovery Expedition, 1901-04, and the ill-

fated Terra Nova Expedition, 1910-13. During this second venture, Scott led a party of five which

reached the South Pole on 17 January 1912, only to find that they had been preceded by Roald

Amundsen's Norwegian expedition. On their return journey, Scott and his four comrades all

perished from a combination of exhaustion, starvation and extreme cold.

Before his appointment to lead the Discovery Expedition, Scott had followed the conventional

career of a naval officer in peacetime Victorian Britain, where opportunities for career advancement

were both limited and keenly sought after by ambitious officers. It was the chance for personal

distinction that led Scott to apply for the Discovery command, rather than any predilection for

polar exploration. However, having taken this step, his name became inseparably associated with

the Antarctic, the field of work to which he remained committed during the final twelve years of

his life.

Following the news of his death, Scott became an iconic British hero, a status maintained for more

than 50 years and reflected by the many permanent memorials erected across the nation. In the

closing decades of the 20th century, the legend was reassessed as attention focused on the causes of

the disaster that ended his and his comrades' lives, and the extent of Scott's personal culpability.

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Terra Nova expedition

It was the expressed hope of the RGS that this expedition would be "scientific primarily, with

exploration and the Pole as secondary objects" but, unlike the Discovery Expedition, neither they

nor the Royal Society were in charge this time. In his expedition prospectus, Scott stated that its

main objective was "to reach the South Pole, and to secure for the British Empire the honour of this

achievement". Scott had, as Markham observed, been "bitten by the Pole mania".

Scott did not know that he would be in a race until he received Amundsen's telegram in Melbourne,

in October 1910. Before this, he had set about fashioning the expedition according to his own

preferences, without the restraints of a joint committee. So far as transport was concerned, he

decided that dogs would be one element in a complex strategy that also involved horses and motor

sledges, and much man-hauling. Scott knew nothing of horses, but felt that as they had seemingly

served Shackleton well, he ought to use them. Dog expert Cecil Meares was going to Siberia to select

the dogs, and Scott ordered that, while he was there, he should deal with the purchase of

Manchurian ponies. Meares was not an experienced horse-dealer, and the ponies he chose proved

mostly of poor quality, and ill-suited to prolonged Antarctic work. Meanwhile, Scott spent time in

France and Norway, testing motor-sledges, and recruited Bernard Day, from Shackleton's

expedition, as his motor expert.

Scott, writing his journal in the Cape Evans hut, winter 1911

The expedition itself suffered a series of early misfortunes, which hampered the first season's work

and impaired preparations for the main polar march. On its journey from New Zealand to the

Antarctic, Terra Nova was trapped in pack ice for 20 days, far longer than other ships had

experienced, which meant a late-season arrival and less time for preparatory work before the

Antarctic winter. One of the motor sledges was lost during its unloading from the ship, disappearing

through the sea ice. Deteriorating weather conditions and weak, un acclimatized ponies affected the

initial depot-laying journey, so that the expedition's main supply point, One Ton Depot, was laid 35

miles (56 km) north of its planned location at 80° S. Lawrence Oates, in charge of the ponies,

advised Scott to kill ponies for food and advance the depot to 80° S, which Scott refused to do.

Oates is reported as saying to Scott, "Sir, I’m afraid you’ll come to regret not taking my advice." Six

ponies died during this journey either from the cold or because they slowed the team down so they

were shot. On its return to base, the expedition learned of the presence of Amundsen, camped with

his crew and a large contingent of dogs in the Bay of Whales, 200 miles (320 km) to their east.

Scott refused to amend his schedule to deal with the Amundsen threat, writing, "The proper, as well

as the wiser course, is for us to proceed exactly as though this had not happened". While

acknowledging that the Norwegian's base was closer to the pole and that his experience as a dog

driver was formidable, Scott had the advantage of travelling over a known route pioneered by

Shackleton. During the 1911 winter his confidence increased; On 2 August, after the return of a

three-man party from their winter journey to Cape Crozier, Scott wrote, "I feel sure we are as near

perfection as experience can direct".

Journey to the Pole

The march south began on 1 November 1911, a caravan of mixed transport groups (motors, dogs,

horses), with loaded sledges, travelling at different rates, all designed to support a final group of four

men who would make a dash for the Pole. Scott had earlier outlined his plans for the southern

journey to the entire shore party, without being specific about precise roles - no one knew who

would form the final polar team. During the journey, Scott sent a series of conflicting orders back to

base concerning the future use of the expedition's dogs, leaving it unclear whether they were to be

saved for future scientific journeys or were to assist the polar party home. Scott's subordinates back

at base were unsure of Scott's intentions, and consequently failed to use the dogs in a concerted

attempt to relieve the returning polar party when the need arose.

The southbound party steadily reduced in size as successive support teams turned back. By 4 January

1912, the last two four-man groups had reached 87° 34′ S.[65] Scott announced his decision: five

men (Scott, Edward Wilson, Henry Bowers, Lawrence Oates and Edgar Evans) would go forward,

the other three (Teddy Evans, William Lashly and Tom Crean) would return. The chosen group

marched on, reaching the Pole on 17 January 1912, only to find that Amundsen had preceded them

by five weeks. Scott's anguish is indicated in his diary: "The worst has happened"; "All the day

dreams must go"; "Great God! This is an awful place".

Last march

Scott's group took this photograph of themselves using a string to operate the shutter on 17 January

1912, the day after they discovered Amundsen had reached the pole first.

The deflated party began the 800-mile (1,300 km) return journey on 19 January. "I'm afraid the

return journey is going to be dreadfully tiring and monotonous", wrote Scott on the next day.

However, the party made good progress despite poor weather, and had completed the Polar Plateau

stage of their journey, approximately 300 miles (500 km), by 7 February. In the following days, as the

party made the 100-mile (160 km) descent of the Beardmore Glacier, the physical condition of

Edgar Evans, which Scott had noted with concern as early as 23 January, declined sharply. A fall on

4 February had left Evans "dull and incapable", and on 17 February, after a further fall, he died near

the glacier foot.

With 400 miles (670 km) still to travel across the Ross Ice Shelf, the party's prospects steadily

worsened as, with deteriorating weather, frostbite, snow blindness, hunger and exhaustion, they

struggled northward. On 16 March, Oates, whose condition was aggravated by an old war-wound to

the extent that he was barely able to walk, voluntarily left the tent and walked to his death. Scott

wrote that Oates' last words were "I am just going outside and may be some time".

After walking a further 20 miles, the three remaining men made their final camp on 19 March, 11

miles (18 km) short of One Ton Depot, but 24 miles (38 km) beyond the original intended location

of the depot. The next day a fierce blizzard prevented their making any progress. During the next

nine days, as their supplies ran out, with frozen fingers, little light, and storms still raging outside the

tent, Scott wrote his final words, although he gave up his diary after 23 March, save for a final entry

on 29 March, with its concluding words: "Last entry. For God's sake look after our people". He left

letters to Wilson's mother, Bowers' mother, a string of notables including his former commander Sir

George Egerton, his own mother and his wife. He also wrote his "Message To The Public",

primarily a defence of the expedition's organization and conduct in which the party's failure is

attributed to weather and other misfortunes, but ending on an inspirational note, with these words:

We took risks, we knew we took them; things have come out against us, and therefore

we have no cause for complaint, but bow to the will of Providence, determined still to

do our best to the last ... Had we lived, I should have had a tale to tell of the

hardihood, endurance, and courage of my companions which would have stirred the

heart of every Englishman. These rough notes and our dead bodies must tell the tale,

but surely, surely, a great rich country like ours will see that those who are dependent

on us are properly provided for.

Scott is presumed to have died on 29 March 1912, possibly a day later. The positions of the bodies